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Abstract 
The ad hoc networking technology can enable novel 
civilian and military applications. However, ad hoc 
networking protocols are vulnerable to a wide range of 
attacks. The design of defense mechanisms is a 
challenging problem, especially in comparison to 
securing traditional, fixed-infrastructure networks. In 
this paper, we discuss challenges and guidelines to 
secure ad hoc networking protocols, and describe a 
protocol suite for secure and fault-tolerant 
communication. 
  
1. Introduction 
Our perception of the Internet and network access 
habits have changed significantly over the last few 
years, with 60 million laptop computers in the US, 
70% of the 45 million business travelers carrying a 
laptop, and 15 million users working on the road daily. 
20 million computers will be wireless enabled by 2006, 
and wireless broadband Internet access will be 
available in 150 thousand locations worldwide, from a 
mere 1200 locations back in 2001. At the same time, 
an increasing number of community wireless networks, 
interconnecting desktop computers and routers 
throughout neighborhoods, are being deployed. 
Furthermore, most portable digital assistants and 
palmtop computers are now equipped with radio and 
infrared transceivers, while cellular telephones offer 
alternative ways of data communication. Overall, the 
network itself undergoes a gradual transformation.  
The emerging Mobile Ad hoc Networking 
(MANET) technology will play a central role, enabling 
devices to communicate across multiple wireless links 
(hops) and areas larger than their transceiver range. 
Most important, a fixed networking infrastructure will 
not be necessary. Instead, network entities will 
collaborate to support basic networking operations, i.e., 
routing and data forwarding, and make up for the 
absent infrastructure.  
Ad hoc networks may be formed in an impromptu 
manner: conferees exchanging information or forming 
workgroups, car computers disseminating warnings to 
avoid traffic jams, downloading maps or traveler’s 
guides from ‘info-kiosks,’ home computers and 
wireless routers forming mesh networks. Ad hoc 
networks may also be deployed on-demand: in disaster 
relief scenarios, consisting of firefighters, policemen, 
medical personnel, and robots, or in battlefields, 
comprising military vehicles, aircrafts, and personnel. 
They may operate autonomously, or extend the fixed 
infrastructure, allowing, for example, remote wireless 
access points or alternate base stations to be reached 
across multi-hop paths.  
The assumption underlying the development of ad 
hoc networking protocols has been that entities 
participate voluntarily and assist the network 
operation. However, assuming a benign environment is 
utopian, as experience from the development of the 
(wire-line) Internet teaches us. Numerous documented 
incidents and outages showed that the network and the 
interconnected systems are vulnerable to a wide range 
of attacks. This is emphatically so in the open and 
volatile ad hoc networking environment. Unlike 
traditional networks, the self-organizing ad hoc 
networking infrastructures are not well protected, 
closely monitored, and managed, and practically any 
network entity can become part of the infrastructure.  
The challenge lies exactly in securing the ad hoc 
network operation, because any malicious or selfish 
network entity can disrupt, degrade, or even deny 
communication of other entities. Securing the network 
operation is paramount for both civilian and tactical 
applications. Users would have no incentive to 
embrace new products if, for example, they cannot 
access their services and get the quality they paid for, if 
the available resources are monopolized by adversarial 
nodes, or if their privacy is at stake. Similarly, a 
General or a Police Commissioner would not endorse 
networking technologies that do not guarantee secure 
and reliable communications in a battlefield or an 
emergency situation. 
In this paper, we discuss the design of secure ad 
hoc networking protocols, providing a system model, 
identifying challenges and guidelines, and describing a 
secure and fault-tolerant communication protocol suite 
for ad hoc networks. 
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 2. System Model 
Mobile hosts collaboratively support the ad hoc 
network operation without necessarily pursuing a 
common objective or running the same application. 
The network membership and connectivity change 
frequently, as nodes may join and leave the network 
without prior notice, e.g., due to mobility or because 
devices alternate between ‘sleep’ and ‘active’ periods. 
As a result, the definition of the network area may 
change constantly, to include access points and 
services reachable by the freely migrating hosts, while 
there may be no administrative boundaries. 
It is often implied that a network node is a host 
equipped with a wireless network interface. However, 
hosts may have more than one network interface, while 
the interface identifier, whether the hardware address 
or the IP address, can be easily changed in most 
platforms. We define a network node as a process with 
(i) a unique identity V, (ii) a public/private key pair EV, 
DV, (iii) a module implementing the networking 
protocols, as those defined in this dissertation, and (iv) 
a module providing communication across a wireless 
network interface. 
 In this work, we focus on the network operation 
above the data-link layer, with transmissions over a 
broadcast radio channel, such as the IEEE 802.11. We 
are concerned with pair-wise communication across 
multiple wireless links between a source, S, and a 
destination, T. We denote S and T as the end nodes, 
and nodes that assist the S, T communication as 
intermediate nodes. 
We assume that nodes can obtain keying material 
for other nodes in the network; in particular, that each 
end-node knows the identity and the public key of its 
peer end-node, and all nodes know the identities and 
the public keys of their neighbors, unless noted 
otherwise. The possession of keys does not imply 
authorization, but it is a minimum requirement for each 
node to engage in secure communication.  
Ad hoc nodes in physical proximity can establish 
keying material through local off-line channels. In 
general, however, key certification will be necessary, 
to ensure a one-to-one relationship between node 
identities and credentials. The exchange of keying 
material can be integrated into the neighbor discovery 
or an initial route discovery. The validation of 
certificates will be possible either through Certification 
Authorities (CAs), or trust chains comprising 
certificates generated by other users. A number of 
approaches are proposed in the literature; due to space 
limitations, we refer the reader to the discussion in [1-
2].  
Nodes may be correct, i.e., fully comply with the 
networking protocols, or faulty, i.e., deviate from the 
protocols’ definition. Faulty nodes may exhibit 
malicious behavior, in which case we say that those 
nodes are adversaries. They can disrupt or abuse the 
operation of any of the networking protocols, 
corrupting, discarding, forging, and replaying data and 
control traffic. Formal discussion and definition of the 
adversary model is given in [1]. 
 
3. Challenges and Guidelines 
Nodes are assisted by other nodes without any 
prior association, as, in general, they communicate 
across largely unknown networks. As a result, they do 
not possess the credentials of all other nodes, this being 
especially true for large-scale ad hoc networks.1 
Nodes lack in general the means to classify their 
peers as trustworthy or adversarial. Pre-configuring 
nodes with such knowledge is clearly hard for an open, 
civilian network with disparate, transiently associated 
nodes. But it can be hard in a tactical network, where 
initially trusted nodes can be hijacked.  
The possession of credentials cannot guarantee 
that a node is correct. Virtually any node in the 
network can disrupt or abuse the protocol operation, 
and degrade or deny the communication of any other 
node in the network. 
Distinguishing malicious faults from network 
impairments is hard. For example, can packet loss due 
to mobility-induced or medium access contention link 
breakages be distinguished from the case that the 
relaying node discards the packet? This problem 
becomes harder when adversaries disguise their 
misbehavior as benign faults. 
Finally, systems enabled by ad hoc networks will 
operate under a multitude of environmental constraints 
and application requirements. A single protocol that 
outperforms all alternative ones in all settings may not 
exist. To address the above-mentioned challenges, a 
comprehensive security solution that can operate in a 
variety of network conditions is necessary.  
First, a secure routing protocol to safeguard the 
discovery of communication paths is needed. It must 
prevent adversaries from influencing, controlling, or 
abusing the route discovery, e.g., by impersonating 
network destinations, advertising unreachable 
destinations or links not reflecting factual connectivity, 
or misleading their peers that a destination can be 
reached at a lower (higher) cost than the actual one 
must be prevented. A specification, i.e., a definition of 
the sought properties of the routing protocol in the 
presence of adversaries, independently of how the 
protocol operates, is provided in [1]. We say that a 
                                                           
1 Closed, mission-specific tactical networks are an exception, 
but, clearly, generalizing such an assumption would 
significantly narrow the scope of ad hoc networking. 
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 discovered route is correct if it satisfies the 
specification. 
Nevertheless, correct routes are not guaranteed to 
be adversary-free. A secure routing protocol cannot 
detect an intelligent adversary that fully abides with the 
route discovery, and only later, once it becomes part of 
a utilized route, disrupts the data communication. Fig. 
1 illustrates the impact of such an adversary when 
security is provided only for the route discovery [3]: 
the reliability of communication drops fast as the 
fraction of adversarial nodes present in the network 
increases. Thus, securing both phases of 
communication, the route discovery and the data 
transmission, is paramount.  
Security services (data authenticity and integrity, 
and replay protection) along with robust detection of 
communication faults are necessary to secure the data 
transmission. Data loss must be detected, so that 
corrective actions are taken, i.e., non-operational or 
compromised routes are avoided, and lost data are re-
transmitted across operational routes. Clearly, the fault 
detection scheme must thwart intelligent adversaries 
that attempt to hide their presence and continue 
disrupting communication across routes they control. 
Designing a secure data transmission protocol that 
relies only on end-to-end security bindings is a 
particularly attractive choice. End-to-end operation can 
eliminate abuse of the route maintenance operation, 
alleviate the need of prolonged observation periods to 
characterize misbehaving nodes as adversaries, avoid 
the vulnerability to ‘blackmail’ attacks by adversaries 
disseminating false misbehavior reports, and the 
overhead and the resultant delay of message exchanges 
with all nodes along a faulty route. 
 
4. A Secure Communication Protocol Suite 
We designed a protocol suite to secure the basic 
networking operation, that is, the route discovery and 
the data forwarding, and achieve our primary goal, the 
availability of communication across frequently 
changing, unknown networks in the presence of 
adversaries. The protocol suite is shown in Fig. 2. The 
data transmission phase is secured by the Secure 
Message Transmission (SMT) and Secure Single Path 
(SSP) protocols [3-4], which rely on an underlying 
secure routing protocol: the Secure Routing Protocol 
(SRP) [5], the Quality-of-Service aware QoS-SRP [6], 
the Distance-Vector DV-SRP [7], and the Secure Link 
State Protocol (SLSP) [8], which interoperate a secure 
neighbor discovery protocol, the Neighbor Lookup 
Protocol (NLP) [1]. Protocols from each category can 
be combined, even though specific combinations, such 
as SRP combined with SMT for example, are more 
versatile and effective.  
NLP provides localized neighbor discovery and 
traffic authentication, with nodes exchanging keys and 
certificates, and establishing shared keys. Equally 
important, NLP prevents adversaries from utilizing 
multiple identities. Protocols bounding the propagation 
delay and thus the data link transmission distance (e.g. 
[9]) can prevent adversaries from acting as raw data 
(signal) repeaters. Since these protocols necessitate 
authentication of transmissions between neighboring 
nodes, the two tasks should be naturally combined.  
SRP is a reactive routing protocol suitable for a 
broad range of MANETs, operating in an end-to-end 
manner without restrictive assumptions on network 
trust and security associations. Low route discovery 
delay with low network and processing overhead can 
be achieved, even when a significant fraction of the 
network nodes disrupt the route discovery. The 
operation of SRP is illustrated in Fig. 3, with QID, QSEQ 
identifiers of the RREQ, KS,T a symmetric key shared 
by S, T, and MAC a message authentication code. 
QoS-SRP thwarts adversaries that manipulate link 
and route metrics to influence the route selection. It 
Figure 1. Communication with security only for
the route discovery.   
Figure 2. Secure Communication Protocol Suite. 
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 enables QoS-aware routing by ensuring that the 
quantitative description (i.e., the attributes) of the 
discovered routes is reasonably close to their actual 
metric values. The basic difference of QoS-SRP from 
basic SRP is the accumulation of link metrics in the 
control packets, and a set of processing steps at end 
and intermediate nodes. The route metric is the 
aggregate of the link metrics. A wide range of link 
route metrics are supported. With explicit information 
on each individual link, QoS-SRP can support any 
route calculation algorithms at the source node. 
DV-SRP discovers on-demand routes, establishing 
them across the network without providing explicitly 
the network connectivity. DV-SRP combines the 
advantages of the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
type of route discovery with security and thus 
resilience. It prevents adversaries from manipulating 
the length (hop count) of the discovered routes, uses 
primarily symmetric key and thus low cost 
cryptographic primitives, and can discover multiple 
routes. However, the fundamental difference of secure 
distance vector protocols such as DV-SRP from SRP 
and QoS-SRP lies in the requirement to authenticate 
the origin of RREQ and RREP (i.e., end nodes) at 
intermediate nodes. Nevertheless, DV-SRP can perform 
this task efficiently, with the intermediate nodes 
verifying the origin authenticity of the control packets.  
SLSP is a (proactive) protocol for discovery and 
distribution of link state information, with nodes 
information for their R-hop neighborhood or zone, as 
illustrated in Fig. 4. Signed link state update (LSU) 
packets are broadcasted, with receiving nodes 
validating the LSUs, suppressing duplicates, and relay 
packet that did not already propagate R hops. Link 
state acquired from validated LSUs is accepted only if 
it is advertised by both nodes incident on the link. 
SLSP provides for each node to distribute its public 
key to nodes within its zone, either by Public Key 
Distribution (PKD) packets, or by attaching the keys to 
LSU packets. As the network topology changes, nodes 
learn the keys of nodes that move into their zone; PKD 
packets may distribute keys less frequently throughout 
an extended zone (R’>R), to reduce the delay of 
validating new keys when nodes eventually enter the 
zone. The propagation of LSU or PKD within R (or R’) 
hops is loosely enforced. 
SMT and SSP operate without restrictive 
assumptions on the network trust and security 
associations, promptly detect and avoid non-
operational or compromised routes, tolerate loss of 
data and control information, and adapt to the network 
conditions. Their main difference is that SMT utilizes 
multiple paths simultaneously, in contrast to SSP’s the 
single path operation.  
In Fig. 5, S disperses the message so that any three 
out of the four transmitted pieces are sufficient for 
successful reconstruction of the original message. Two 
of the pieces, each routed across a different route, 
arrive intact at the receiver, while the remaining two 
pieces are compromised by adversaries on the 
transmission paths; e.g., one piece is dropped and one 
(dashed arrow) is modified. The cryptographic 
integrity check reveals the corrupted data, T rejects the 
piece and waits for additional message pieces (as 
determined in the header of incoming validated 
pieces), after setting a reception timer. At the timer 
expiration, the destination feedback is returned across 
 
Figure 5. SMT message transmission example. 
 
Route Reply (RREP): QID, T, V3, V2, V1, S,  
                                   MAC(KS,T, QID, QSEQ, T, V3, V2, V1, S) 
 
(5)  T → V3  : RREP; 
(6) V3 → V2 : RREP; 
(7) V2 → V1 : RREP; 
(8) V1 → S   : RREP; 
S V1 V3 V2 T
1 2 3 4
8 7 6 5
Route Request (RREQ): S, T, QSEQ, QID, MAC(KS,T, S, T, QSEQ, QID) 
(1)  S   broadcasts RREQ; 
(2)  V1 broadcasts RREQ, V1;  
(3)  V2 broadcasts RREQ, V1, V2;  
(4)  V3 broadcasts RREQ, V1, V2, V3;  
Figure 3. SRP operation. 
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Figure 4. SLSP operation. 
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 the two operational paths. The sender receives and 
validates the feedback, ignoring duplicates, and 
retransmits the two missing pieces. One of them is lost, 
for example, because of intermittent malicious 
behavior, however, the destination has an adequate 
number of packets (3 out of 4), and acknowledges the 
successful reception to complete the message 
transmission. 
Integrating SMT and SSP with secure routing reveals 
the importance of securing both phases of 
communication. In Fig. 6, SMT delivers 93% of 
transmitted messages even when 50% of the network 
nodes disrupt the data transmission [4]. More 
important, highly reliable communication is achieved 
without retransmissions. As a result, SMT can support 
time-sensitive or real-time communication even in 
highly adverse settings, with near-constant delay and 
delay jitter.  
This is achieved with moderate network overhead, 
with SMT configuring transmissions to either achieve 
strong protection, or efficient operation. In the extreme 
case, SSP eliminates multipath transmission overhead. 
Highly reliable communication is achieved while 
sacrificing the real-time aspect, trading off delay for 
overhead. Fig. 7 shows the versatility of SMT/SSP 
which can be highly effective even in resource 
constrained environment, and overall achieve strong 
protection and be practical.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The secure communication protocol suite 
discussed in this paper can be widely applicable, being 
both effective, achieving highly reliable, low-delay and 
low-jitter communication even in highly adverse 
settings, and, at the same time, capable to operate in 
resource-constrained settings. However, our solution is 
not exhaustive, as there exists a range of additional 
security aspects largely orthogonal to denial of service, 
such as key and trust management, anonymity, and 
privacy.  
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